

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
CENTRAL DIVISION

KEITH KRUEGER and RANDY BREVER,)
Plaintiffs,)
v.)
NEUBERGER BERMAN MANAGEMENT, INC.,)
NEUBERGER BERMAN, L.L.C.,)
Defendants.)



COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs, Keith Krueger and Randy Brever, for the use and benefit of the Neuberger Berman Genesis Fund and the Neuberger Berman Guardian Fund, sue Defendants, Neuberger Berman Management, Inc., and Neuberger Berman, L.L.C., and allege:

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. This action is a derivative action brought by the Plaintiffs on behalf of the Neuberger Berman Genesis Fund and the Neuberger Berman Guardian Fund (collectively, the "Funds") pursuant to §§ 36(b) and 12(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("ICA"), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-35(b) and 80a-12(b).

2. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(5), and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

3. Venue is proper in this judicial district pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331(b)(2)-(3). Defendants are inhabitants of or transact business in this district, a substantial part of the events or omissions that give rise to Plaintiffs' claims occurred in this district, and Defendants may be found in this district.

4. All conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred.

II. BACKGROUND

5. Plaintiffs are shareholders in the Funds, which are open-end registered investment companies, or mutual funds, created, sold, advised, and managed with other funds as part of a fund family or complex by Defendants (the "Fund Complex" or the "Neuberger Berman Complex"). Defendants, as the underwriters, distributors, advisors, and control persons of the Funds, owe fiduciary and other duties to Plaintiffs and all shareholders of the funds in the Fund Complex.

6. Plaintiffs and the other shareholders of the Funds pay Defendants fees for providing pure investment advisory services and administrative services. These fees are based on a percentage of the net assets of each of the funds in the Fund Complex. Defendants charge separate fees for the pure investment advisory services and the administrative services.

7. The pure investment advisory services Defendants provide to the Funds are identical to the investment advisory services Defendants provide to other clients, such as institutional clients, and entail identical costs. In fact, the cost of advisors, analysts, research data, the physical plant, and other aspects of Defendants' investment advisory services are shared between the mutual funds and the other clients.

8. Despite the equivalence of the investment advisory services Defendants provide to the Funds and the other clients, the fees Defendants receive from the Funds for pure investment advisory services are much higher than the fees Defendants or their affiliates receive from other clients for the identical services.

9. Defendants also charge distribution fees for marketing, selling, and distributing

mutual fund shares to new shareholders pursuant to distribution plans that Defendants have adopted with respect to the Funds pursuant to Rule 12b-1, 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1 ("Distribution Plans"). The distribution fees are based on a percentage of the net assets of each of the Funds. Defendants purportedly collect these fees in order to grow or stabilize the assets of the Funds so that the Funds can benefit from economies of scale through reduced advisory fees.

Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940

10. In 1940, Congress enacted the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq. (the "ICA"). The ICA was designed to regulate and curb abuses in the mutual fund industry and to create standards of care applicable to investment advisors such as Defendants. In the 1960s, it became clear to Congress that investment advisors to equity mutual funds were gouging those funds with excessive fees, particularly by not taking economies of scale into account. As a result, § 36(b), 15 U.S.C., § 80a-35(b), was added to the ICA in 1970, which created a federal cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty.

11. Section 36(b) provides in pertinent part:

[T]he investment adviser of a registered investment company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of payments of a material nature, paid by such registered investment company, or by the security holders thereof, to such investment adviser or any affiliated person of such investment adviser. An action may be brought under this subsection by the Commission, or by a security holder of such registered investment company on behalf of such company, against such investment advisers, or an affiliated person of such investment advisor, or any other person enumerated in subsection (a) of this section who has a fiduciary duty concerning such compensation or payments, for breach of fiduciary duty in respect to such compensation or payments paid by such registered investment company or by the security holders thereof to such investment adviser or person. . . .

12. In the past decade, the assets managed by Defendants within the Fund Complex have grown dramatically. In 1993, the Fund Complex (excluding money market funds) had \$882.4 million in average net assets. By 2003, the fund had exploded to nearly \$9.0 billion in average net assets, an increase of more than ten times. Meanwhile, advisory fees for the Fund Complex (excluding money market funds) increased from \$5.025 million (or 0.57% of assets) in 1993 to \$52.731 million (or 0.59% of assets) in 2003. Effectively no economies of scale or incremental savings were realized by the investor in spite of the Fund Complex's dramatic growth.

13. While the assets of the Fund Complex and the fees have grown dramatically in size, the nature of the services rendered by Defendants has changed little, if at all. Indeed, advances in computing and communication technologies in the past twenty years have resulted in exponential efficiencies that have dramatically reduced the costs of servicing mutual funds in ways Congress could not have imagined when it enacted ICA § 36(b). Nonetheless, the fees paid to Defendants have grown dramatically. As a result, the advisory fees paid to Defendants (and accepted by them in violation of their statutory fiduciary duties) are disproportionately large in relationship to the services rendered to Plaintiffs.

14. In addition, Defendants, in violation of their fiduciary duties to Plaintiffs, have retained excess profits resulting from economies of scale. These economies of scale are a product of the dramatic growth in assets managed by Defendants, caused in part by marketing programs paid for with the distribution fees charged to Plaintiffs and the other shareholders and in part by Defendants' ability to provide the identical investment advisory services they provide Plaintiffs to other clients at little or no additional cost. The excess profits resulting from these economies of scale belong to Plaintiffs and the other shareholders of the Funds.

15. The fees paid to Defendants are technically approved by the Funds' board of directors.¹ A majority of the Funds' board is comprised of statutorily presumed "disinterested" directors as that term is defined in § 10 of the ICA. Regardless of whether these presumably "disinterested" directors meet the requirements of § 10 of the ICA, there is a lack of conscientiousness by the directors in reviewing the advisory and distribution fees paid by each of the Funds. In addition, even if statutorily disinterested, the directors are in all practical respects dominated and unduly influenced by Defendants in reviewing the fees paid by Plaintiffs and the other shareholders of the Funds. In particular, Defendants do not provide the directors with sufficient information for the directors to fulfill their obligations, a factor supporting a finding that Defendants have breached their fiduciary duties.

16. Although the fees challenged in this lawsuit may appear to the Court to be very small on a shareholder-by-shareholder basis, they cause a dramatic decrease in Plaintiffs' investment returns over time. Arthur Levitt, past Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), was critical of what he called the "tyranny of compounding high costs":

Instinct tells me that many investors would be shocked to know how seemingly small fees can over time, create such drastic erosion in returns. ... In the years ahead, what will mutual fund investors say if they realize too late their returns have fallen hard under the weight of compounding fees?

Arthur Levitt, Jr., Inaugural address: Costs Paid with Other People's Money, Address at Fordham University School of Law (Nov. 3, 2000), in 6 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 261, 267 (2001).

¹ While the Funds at issue here are technically governed by a board of trustees rather than directors, the term "directors" is used throughout the complaint and should be read as synonymous with "trustees," as it is under the ICA. See 15 U.S.C., § 80a-2(a)(12).

Rule 12b-1 Distribution Plans

17. Prior to 1980, the use of fund assets (which are owned by the shareholders) to sell new fund shares was prohibited. The SEC had historically been reluctant to allow fund advisers to charge their shareholders for selling shares to others:

[T]he cost of selling and purchasing mutual fund shares should be borne by the investors who purchase them and thus presumably receive the benefits of the investment, and not, even in part, by the existing shareholders of the fund who often derive little or no benefit from the sale of new shares.

Statement on the Future Structure of the Securities Markets, [Feb. 1972] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 137 pt. II, at 7.

18. After intense lobbying by the mutual fund industry, the Commission agreed to consider modifying its objections to allow current fund shareholders to pay distribution expenses. In early comment letters and in proxy statements proposing adoption of plans of distribution, the mutual fund industry argued that adding assets to an existing mutual fund would create economies of scale that would allow the advisers to provide the same quality and nature of services to mutual fund shareholders at dramatically lower costs.

19. Accepting the mutual fund industry's argument that a growth in assets would lead to a quid pro quo reduction in advisory fees and other expenses, the Commission tentatively approved Rule 12b-1, 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1. However, numerous conditions were attached to the use of fund assets to pay distribution expenses. For example, the Commission wanted to be certain that investment advisers would not "extract additional compensation for advisory services by excessive distributions under a 12b-1 plan." *Meyer v. Oppenheimer Management Corp.*, 895 F.2d 861, 866 (2d Cir. 1990). Unfortunately, that is precisely what Defendants have done:

extracted additional compensation for their retail advisory services by causing Plaintiffs and the other shareholders to pay Defendants' marketing expenses to acquire new shareholders so that these new shareholders could pay additional advisory fees to Defendants. Under this regime, Defendants get the financial benefit, and the shareholders of the Funds bear the financial burden.

20. Defendants have adopted 12b-1 Distribution Plans for the Funds. These Distribution Plans must be reviewed annually by the Funds' directors. In particular, the directors must "request and evaluate . . . such information as may reasonably be necessary to an informed decision of whether such plan should be implemented or continued." 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1(d). In addition, minutes must be maintained to record all aspects of the directors' deliberation, and the directors must conclude "in light of their fiduciary duties under state law and under Sections 36(a) and (b) of the ICA, that there is a reasonable likelihood that the Distribution Plans will benefit the company and its shareholders." 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1(e).

21. Despite the dramatic growth in assets managed by Defendants, both the advisory and distribution fees charged by Defendants have grown, both in terms of whole dollars and as a percentage of assets. Accordingly, the Distribution Plans have produced little or no economies-of-scale benefits to the shareholders of the Funds. Rather, the Distribution Plans have served only Defendants, just as the Commission feared when it found that "the use of mutual fund assets to finance distribution activities would benefit mainly the management of a mutual fund rather than its shareholders, and therefore that such use of fund assets should not be permitted."

Bearing of Distribution Expenses by Mutual Funds, Investment Company Act Release No. 9915, 1977 SEC LEXIS 943 (Aug. 31, 1977). As such, the Distribution Plans violate the intent and purpose of Rule 12b-1 and are entirely a waste of fund assets.

22. Furthermore, the distribution fees are based on the net asset value of the Funds and not on the distribution activity, if any, by Defendants, such as number of shares sold. Accordingly, in addition to failing to benefit Plaintiffs and the other shareholders, the Distribution Plans have extracted additional compensation for advisory services to Defendants, thereby resulting in excessive fees paid to them. For example, any portion of the fees paid to Defendants that are derived from market increases in the net asset value of the fund rather than any distribution activity by Defendants constitutes additional and excessive compensation for advisory services.

23. Despite the fact that Plaintiffs and the other shareholders of the Funds have enjoyed no benefits from the Distribution Plans, even though they contributed to the growth of fund assets by paying distribution fees, and despite the fact that the Distribution Plans have allowed Defendants to extract additional and excessive compensation from Plaintiffs and the other shareholders of the Funds, the directors of the Funds have continued to approve, year after year, continuation of the Distribution Plans in violation of both Rule 12b-1 and § 36(b).

Nature of Claims

24. In this action, Plaintiffs seek to rescind the investment advisory agreements and Distribution Plans and to recover for the Funds the total fees charged by Defendants or, alternatively, to recover for the Funds the excess profits resulting from economies of scale wrongfully retained by Defendants and to recover for the Funds other excessive compensation received by, or improper payments wrongfully retained by, Defendants in breach of their fiduciary duty under the ICA § 36(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b). Because the conduct complained of herein is continuing in nature, Plaintiffs seek recovery for a period commencing at the earliest

date in light of any applicable statute of limitations through the date of final judgment after trial.

25. No pre-suit demand on the board of directors of the Funds is required, as the requirements of F.R.C.P. 23.1 do not apply to actions under § 36(b) of the ICA. *Daily Income Fund v. Fox*, 464 U.S. 523 (1984).

26. Plaintiffs do not allege or seek relief for any claims based upon improper market timing or late trading activity involving the Funds.

II. PARTIES

27. Plaintiff Keith Krueger is a resident of Jefferson City, Missouri. He is a shareholder at all relevant times of the Neuberger Berman Genesis Fund.

28. Plaintiff Randy Brever is a resident of Seffner, Florida. He is a shareholder at all relevant times of the Neuberger Berman Guardian Fund.

29. Each of the Funds is a separate operating series of Neuberger Berman Equity Funds, a Delaware statutory trust that is registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Investment Company Act of 1940 as a diversified, open-end management investment company.

30. Defendant Neuberger Berman Management, Inc. ("NB Management") is a New York corporation and is registered as an investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and as a broker dealer under the laws of Missouri. NB Management is the investment advisor, administrator, distributor and principal underwriter to each of the Funds. NB Management also acts as a sub-advisor for a number of private label mutual funds and provides account advisory services for institutional accounts. NB Management is wholly owned by Neuberger Berman, Inc., a publicly traded holding company and an indirect subsidiary of

Lehman Brothers Holding, Inc.

31. Defendant Neuberger Berman, L.L.C. ("Neuberger Berman") is a Delaware limited liability corporation and is registered as an investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and as a broker-dealer under the laws of Missouri. Neuberger Berman is a subadviser to each of the Funds and is paid a portion of the advisory fee paid by the Funds to NB Management. Neuberger Berman is wholly owned by Neuberger Berman, Inc., a publicly traded holding company and an indirect subsidiary of Lehman Brothers Holding, Inc.

IV. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

32. The test for determining whether compensation paid to Defendants violates § 36(b) is "essentially whether the fee schedule represents a charge within the range of what would have been negotiated at arm's-length in the light of all of the surrounding circumstances." *Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc.*, 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1982). In order to violate § 36(b), "the advisor-manager must charge a fee that is so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm's-length bargaining." *Id.*

33. In applying this test, all pertinent facts must be weighed in determining whether a fee or other compensation violates § 36(b). The *Gartenberg* court specifically identified six factors (a portion of "all pertinent facts") to be considered in determining whether a fee is so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered. These factors include: (1) the nature and quality of the services rendered; (2) the profitability of the funds to the advisor/manager; (3) economies of scale; (4) comparative fee structures; (5) fallout benefits (i.e. indirect profits to the advisor/manager resulting from the existence of the funds; and

(6) the care and conscientiousness of the directors. A review of these factors, and the facts in this case, demonstrates that the fees charged by Defendants to the Funds violate § 36(b).

(1) The Nature and Quality of the Services Provided to the Funds

34. The nature of the investment advisory services provided to the Funds is straightforward: Defendants buy and sell, at their discretion, stocks, bonds, and other securities for the Funds. This is precisely the same service provided to Defendants' institutional and other clients (albeit at a dramatically lower cost). On information and belief, the materials provided by Defendants to the directors of the Funds establish that the nature of these services has remained unchanged despite dramatic growth in the assets of the Funds and advisory revenues.

35. Despite the fact that the Funds receive identical investment advisory services as Defendants' institutional and other clients, on information and belief Plaintiffs pay Defendants dramatically higher fees because these fees are not negotiated at arm's length as they are with the institutional and other clients. This disparity in fees evinces Defendants' willingness and determination to prefer their own financial interests to the interests of the Funds and the shareholders of the Funds.

36. On information and belief, Defendants repeatedly put their own financial interests ahead of the interests of the Funds and the shareholders of the Funds by participating in arrangements and schemes that benefit Defendants at the expense of the Funds and the shareholders of the Funds. The cost of this conflict of interest, which does not exist in the case of the arm's-length relationships with other clients, is manifest not only in higher fees, but in other losses and expenses borne by the Funds and the shareholders of the Funds. These losses and expenses directly impact the quality of the investment advisory services Defendants provide

to the Funds

(2) The Profitability of the Fund to the Adviser/Manager

37. "[T]he 'profitability of the fund to the adviser' [must] be studied in order that the price paid by the fund to its adviser be equivalent to 'the product of arm's-length bargaining.'"

See John P. Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: The Cost of Conflicts of Interest, 26 J. Corp L. 610, 661 (2001) (the "Freeman & Brown Study") (citing *Gartenberg*) [Ex. 1]. The profitability of a fund to an adviser-manager is a function of revenues minus the costs of providing services. However, upon information and belief, Defendants' reporting of their revenues and costs is intended to, and does, obfuscate Defendants' true profitability. For instance, upon information and belief, Defendants employ inaccurate accounting practices in their financial reporting, including arbitrary and unreasonable cost allocations.

38. Defendants' true profitability can be determined on either an incremental basis or a full-cost basis. Defendants' incremental costs of providing advisory services to Plaintiffs are nominal while the additional fees received by Defendants are hugely disproportionate given that the nature, quality, and level of the services remain the same. On information and belief, a review of Defendants' full costs of providing advisory services will also demonstrate the enormous profitability to Defendants of managing the Funds.

(3) Economies of Scale

39. The existence of economies of scale in the mutual fund industry has been recently confirmed by both the SEC and the Governmental Accounting Office (the "GAO"). Both conducted in-depth studies of mutual fund fees in 2000, and both concluded that economies of scale exist in the provision of advisory services. *See* SEC Division of Investment Management:

Report on Mutual Fund Fees and Expenses (Dec. 2000) ("SEC Report"), at 30-31 [Ex. 2]; GAO, Report on Mutual Fund Fees to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Finance and Hazardous Materials; and the Ranking Member, Committee on Commerce, House of Representatives (June 2000) ("GAO Report"), at 9 [Ex. 3].

40. In addition, the most significant academic research undertaken since the Wharton School study in the 1960s establishes the existence of economies of scale that are not being passed along to mutual fund shareholders in violation of Defendants' duty to do so under § 36(b). *See Freeman & Brown Study* [Ex. 1]. As the Freeman & Brown Study noted: "The existence of economies of scale has been admitted in SEC filings made by fund managers and is implicit in the industry's frequent use of fee rates that decrease as assets under management increase. Fund industry investment managers are prone to cite economies of scale as justification for business combinations." Id. at 620 [Ex. 1].

41. These economies of scale exist not only fund by fund but also exist with respect to an entire fund complex and even with respect to an investment advisor's entire scope of operations, including services provided to institutional and other clients. *See Freeman & Brown Study* at 621 n.62 (quoting Victoria E. Schonfeld & Thomas M.J. Kerwin, *Organization of a Mutual Fund*, 49 Bus. Law 107 (1993)) [Ex. 1].

42. The clearest example of economies of scale occurs when total assets under management increase due purely to market forces (without the institution of new advisory relationships or new asset gathering). In such instances, as the GAO confirms, it is possible for the advisor to service the additional assets with zero additional costs. See GAO Report at 9 (noting that growth from portfolio appreciation is unaccompanied by costs) [Ex. 3]. In other

words, an investment advisor can advise a fund that doubles in size purely because of market forces with no increased costs because the services are unchanged. *See* GAO Report at 9 [Ex. 3]; Freeman & Brown Study at 619 n.43, 621 (noting that investment advisors have benefited by garnering "increased fees from the general increase in market prices with no commensurate efforts on their part" and also noting that as much as 64% of mutual fund asset growth has come from appreciation of portfolio securities, which, unlike growth from share sales to new investors, is costless) [Ex. 1].

43. From 1993 through 2003, the assets under management in the Neuberger Berman Complex (excluding money market funds) grew from \$882.4 million to nearly \$9.0 billion. However, this phenomenal growth in mutual fund assets not only produced no economies of scale, but fees actually increased faster than the growth in assets. Fees went from \$5.025 million (or 0.57% of assets) in 1993 to \$52.731 million (or 0.59% of assets) in 2003. The foregoing figures make a mockery of the concept of economies of scale.

44. The economies of scale enjoyed by Defendants with respect to the Funds have not been shared with Plaintiffs and the other shareholders as required by § 36(b) and Rule 12b-1. As a result, the fees paid to Defendants for advisory services provided to the Funds are grossly disproportionate to those services, are excessive, and violate § 36(b).

(4) Comparative Fee Structures

45. The fees advisors receive from mutual funds for investment advisory services are directly comparable to, though much higher than, the fees advisors receive from other clients for the identical services. As the Freeman & Brown Study noted: "None of the leading advisory fee cases involved equity funds, and hence, none of the courts were confronted directly with the

strong analogies that can be drawn between equity advisory services in the fund industry as compared to the pension field where prices are notably lower." Freeman & Brown Study at 653 [Ex. 1]. While a "manager may encounter different levels of fixed and variable research costs depending on the type of the portfolio, . . . the fundamental management process is essentially the same for large and small portfolios, as well as for pension funds and mutual funds. The portfolio owner's identity (pension fund versus mutual fund) should not logically provide a reason for portfolio management costs being higher or lower." Freeman & Brown Study at 627-28 [Ex. 1]. Indeed, "a mutual fund, as an entity, actually is an institutional investor. When it comes to fee discrepancies, the difference between funds and other institutional investors does not turn on 'institutional status,' it turns on self-dealing and conflict of interest." Freeman & Brown Study at 629 n.93 [Ex. 1]. Accordingly, the "'apples-to-apples' fee comparisons between equity pension managers and equity fund managers can be most difficult and embarrassing for those selling advice to mutual funds." Freeman & Brown Study at 671-72 [Ex. 1].

46. More recently, New York's Attorney General surveyed two fund complexes and confirmed the existence of massive over-charging of fund advisory fees. Specifically, Mr. Spitzer testified before a Senate Subcommittee on January 27, 2004, as follows:

Putnam's mutual fund investors were charged 40 percent more for advisory services than Putnam's institutional investors. In dollar terms, what this fee disparity means is that in 2002 Putnam mutual fund investors paid \$290 million more in advisory fees than they would have paid had they been charged the rate given to Putnam's institutional clients, and these are for identical services.

There was a similar disparity in the advisory fees charged by Alliance. Once again, mutual fund investors were charged significantly higher advisory fees than institutional investors. Specifically, Alliance's mutual fund investors paid advisory fees that were twice those paid by

institutional investors. In dollar terms, this means that Alliance investors paid more than \$200 million more in advisory fees than they would have paid had they been charged the rate given to Alliance's institutional clients.

47. On information and belief, the shareholders of the Funds at issue here are plagued by the same discriminatory over-charging. Indeed, a number of relevant comparative fee structures clearly establish that Defendants are charging advisory fees to the Funds that are disproportionate to the value of the services rendered. For example:

- a. NB Management has entered into an agreement with American Skandia Investment Services, Incorporated, to serve as the subadvisor to the ASA Fund. For its services, NB Management receives a fee equal to 40 basis points (.40%) of the average daily net assets (the "American Skandia Fee Schedule"). By way of contrast, the Neuberger Berman Genesis Fund pays NB Management a fee equal to 85 basis points (.85%) of the first \$250 million in assets, 80 basis points (.80%) of the next \$250 million in assets, 75 basis points (.75%) of the next \$250 million in assets, 70 basis points (70%) of next \$250 million in assets, and 65 basis points (.65%) of assets in excess of \$1 billion. If the Neuberger Berman Genesis Fund, which has \$6.5464 billion in assets, benefited from the American Skandia Fee Schedule, it would pay an advisory fee of only 40 basis points (.40%) rather than the 69 basis points (.69%) it currently pays. This would amount to an annual savings of over \$17.6 million.
- b. NB Management has entered into an agreement with Principal Management Corporation to serve as the subadvisor to the Principal Partners MidCap Value Fund and the MidCap Value Series of Principal Variable Contracts Funds, Inc. For its services, NB Management receives a fee equal to 50 basis points (.50%) of the first \$100 million in assets; 47.5 basis points (.475%) of the next \$150 million in assets; 45 basis points (.45%) of the next \$250 million in assets; 42.5 basis points (.425%) of the next \$250 million in assets; and 40 basis points (.40%) of assets over \$750 million (the "Principal Fee Schedule"). If the Neuberger Berman Genesis Fund, which has \$6.5464 billion in assets, benefited from the Principal Fee schedule, it would pay an advisory fee of only 41 basis points (.41%) rather than the 69 basis points (.69%) it currently pays. This would amount to an annual savings of over \$17.2 million.

(5) Fallout Benefits

48. Defendants indirectly profit because of the existence of the Funds through fallout benefits. Obvious, but difficult to quantify fallout benefits include the attraction of new customers, cross selling related funds to current customers, and other benefits associated generally with the development of goodwill and the growth in assets of the Funds.

49. Other, easier to quantify, benefits include "soft dollars" payable from broker-dealers. Essentially, "soft dollars" are credits furnished to Defendants from broker-dealers and other securities-industry firms in exchange for routing the Funds' securities transaction orders and other business to paying firms. These soft-dollar credits should be used to purchase research and other goods or services that benefit the shareholders of the Funds. On information and belief, however, the soft-dollar arrangements benefit Defendants and result in increased costs to the shareholders of the Funds with little to no corresponding benefits to the shareholders of the Funds. On information and belief, the soft dollar arrangements are concealed from the shareholders of the Funds in breach of Defendants' fiduciary duty.

50. On information and belief, Defendants also receive "kickbacks," either directly or indirectly, as transfer agency and custodian fees grow due to increases in the assets of the Funds and the number of shareholders.

51. On information and belief, Defendants receive further fallout benefits from securities lending arrangements. Essentially, Defendants loan out the securities of the Funds and receive compensation as the lending agents of the Funds.

52. A highly profitable fallout benefit to Defendants is the ability to sell investment advisory services paid for by the Funds at virtually no additional cost. Much like computer

software, once the investment research and resulting recommendations are paid for, that research and those recommendations may be sold to other clients at virtually no cost whatsoever to Defendants. Without payment by Plaintiffs and the other shareholders of the Funds of millions of dollars in advisory and distribution fees (especially distribution fees that are nothing more than a means to extract additional compensation for advisory services), Defendants would have to pay to conduct that research independently in order to provide investment advisory services to other clients, including institutional clients. This is a natural byproduct of the extraordinary economies of scale inherent in the investment advisory business. However, although Plaintiffs and the other shareholders of the Funds pay all of the costs associated with the investment advisory services, Defendants resell these services to third parties without compensating Plaintiffs through reduced fees or in any other way.

53. On information and belief, Defendants do not provide sufficient information regarding the existence and extent of these and other fallout benefits to the shareholders of the Funds or to the Funds' directors. The directors are thus unable to quantify or even meaningfully consider the benefits. Plaintiffs and the other shareholders of the Funds have paid for these benefits and are entitled to compensation in the form of reduced advisory fees and the elimination of distribution fees.

(6) The Independence and Conscientiousness of the Directors

54. At least 40% of the Funds' directors must be "disinterested" as defined in § 10 of the ICA. As the GAO Report noted, the structure of most mutual funds embodies a potential conflict of interest between the fund's shareholders and its adviser. This conflict arises because the fees paid by the shareholders represent revenue to the adviser. The United States Supreme

Court has stated that the disinterested-director requirement is "the cornerstone of the ICA's efforts to control" this conflict of interest. *Burks v. Lasker*, 441 U.S. 471 (1979).

55. The disinterested directors are supposed to serve as "watchdogs" for the shareholders of the Funds. As such, the disinterested directors have primary responsibility for, among many other things, negotiating and approving all contracts and agreements with Defendants and reviewing the reasonableness of the advisory and distribution fees received by Defendants. Accordingly, as noted by the GAO, the directors are expected to review, among other things, the advisor's costs, whether fees have been reduced when the Funds' assets have grown, and the fees charged for similar services. See GAO Report at 14 [Ex. 3]. These responsibilities are intensive, requiring the directors to rely on information provided by Defendants. Defendants, in turn, have a fiduciary duty to provide all information reasonably necessary for the directors to perform their obligations. *See* 15 U.S.C., § 80a-15(c); 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1.

56. The ICA contains a presumption that the disinterested directors are in fact disinterested. However, the lack of conscientiousness of even disinterested directors in reviewing the fees paid by the Funds, the lack of adequate information provided to the directors in connection with their approvals of the advisory agreements and Distribution Plans, and the control of management over the directors in reviewing the fees paid by the Funds are not presumed but, rather, are important factors recognized in the *Gartenberg* line of cases in determining whether Defendants have breached their fiduciary duties. In addition, the SEC has specifically recognized that even disinterested directors may not be independent but, rather, may be subject to domination or undue influence by a fund's investment adviser. For example, the

SEC has stated that "disinterested directors should not be entrusted with a decision on use of fund assets for distribution without receiving the benefit of measures designed to enhance their ability to act independently." Bearing of Distribution Expenses by Mutual Funds, Investment Co. Act Rel. No. 11414, 1980 SEC LEXIS 444 at *36 (Oct. 28, 1980).

57. Two noteworthy industry insiders have commented on the general failure of mutual fund boards to fulfill their responsibilities under the ICA. Jack Bogle, founder of the Vanguard Group, made the following comment:

Well, fund directors are, or at least to a very major extent, sort of a bad joke. They've watched industry fees go up year after year, they've added 12b-1 fees. I think they've forgotten, maybe they've never been told, that the law, the Investment Company Act, says they're required to put the interest of the fund shareholders ahead of the interest of the fund adviser. It's simply impossible for me to see how they could have ever measured up to that mandate, or are measuring up to it.

Warren Buffet, famous investor and chairman of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., made the following comment, which was recently quoted by a United States District Court:

I think independent directors have been anything but independent. The Investment Company Act, in 1940, made these provisions for independent directors on the theory that they would be the watchdogs for all these people pooling their money. The behavior of independent directors in aggregate since 1940 has been to rubber stamp every deal that's come along from management—whether management was good, bad, or indifferent. Not negotiate for fee reductions and so on. A long time ago, an attorney said that in selecting directors, the management companies were looking for Cocker Spaniels and not Dobermans. I'd say they found a lot of Cocker Spaniels out there. *Strougo v. BEA Assoc.*, 188 F. Supp.2d 373, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citation omitted).

Mr. Buffet also stated, in a letter to shareholders in the 2002 Berkshire Hathaway, Inc.

annual report:

[A] monkey will type out a Shakespeare play before an "independent" mutual-fund director will suggest that his fund look at other managers, even if the incumbent manager has persistently delivered substandard performance. When they are handling their own money, of course, directors will look to alternative advisors – but it never enters their minds to do so when they are acting as fiduciaries for others. . . . Investment company directors have failed as well in negotiating management fees If you or I were empowered, I can assure you that we could easily negotiate materially lower management fees with the incumbent managers of most mutual funds. And, believe me, if directors were promised a portion of any fee savings they realized, the skies would be filled with falling fees. Under the current system, though, reductions mean nothing to "independent" directors while meaning everything to managers. So guess who wins? . . . [I]n stepping up to [their] all-important responsibilities, tens of thousands of "independent" directors, over more than six decades, have failed miserably. (They've succeeded, however, in taking care of themselves; their fees from serving on multiple boards of a single "family" of funds often run well into six figures.) 2002 Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. Annual Report to Shareholders, p. 17 – 18.

58. As part of their scheme to receive excessive fees, Defendants did not keep the directors fully informed regarding all material facts and aspects of their fees and other compensation, and the directors failed to insist upon adequate information. For example:

- a. On information and belief, Defendants provided virtually no information to the directors regarding the advisory fees charged to pension and other institutional clients or to other mutual funds being advised or sub-advised by Defendants.
- b. On information and belief, Defendants provided virtually no information to the directors regarding the economies of scale enjoyed or fallout benefits received by Defendants.
- c. On information and belief, the profitability data given to the board of directors provide no explanation as to how the board should evaluate economies of scale and do not explain how the shareholders benefit from distribution plans.
- d. On information and belief, the board of directors of the Funds failed to request and evaluate, and Defendants failed to provide, information reasonably necessary

to an informed determination of whether the Distribution Plans should have been implemented and whether they should be continued.

e. On information and belief, the directors rarely, if ever, question any information or recommendations provided by Defendants.

59. The foregoing assures that the directors do not understand Defendants' true cost structure and, in particular, the economies of scale enjoyed by them in providing investment advisory services to the Funds and their institutional and other clients. Nor do the directors understand the nature of the Distribution Plans and the benefits received by Defendants, and lack of benefits received by Plaintiffs and the other shareholders, from the Distribution Plans.

60. On information and belief, the disinterested directors of the Funds have not receive the benefit of any measures to enhance their ability to act independently, which has caused the directors to be dependent on Defendants and has allowed Defendants to dominate and unduly influence the directors. In addition, the directors' failure to insist on adequate information evinces a lack of care and conscientiousness on their part.

**COUNT I
ICA §36(b)
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
(Excessive Investment Advisory Fees)**

61. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

62. The fees charged by Defendants for providing advisory services to the Funds are and continue to be disproportionate to the services rendered and are not within the range of what would have been negotiated at arm's length in light of all the surrounding circumstances, including the advisory fees that Defendants charge their other clients.

63. In charging and receiving excessive or inappropriate compensation, and in failing to put the interests of Plaintiffs and the other shareholders of the Funds ahead of their own interests, Defendants have breached and continue to breach their statutory fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs in violation of ICA § 36(b).

64. Plaintiffs seek, pursuant to § 36(b)(3) of the ICA, the "actual damages resulting from the breach of fiduciary duty" by Defendants, up to and including, "the amount of compensation or payments received from" the Funds.

COUNT II
ICA § 36(b)
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
(Excess Profits from Economies of Scale)

65. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

66. Defendants have received and continue to receive excess profits attributable to extraordinary economies of scale and, ironically, at least in part at Plaintiffs' expense in the form of payment of distribution fees benefiting only Defendants.

67. By retaining excess profits derived from economies of scale, Defendants have breached and continue to breach their statutory fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs in violation of ICA § 36(b).

68. Plaintiffs seek, pursuant to § 36(b)(3) of the ICA, the "actual damages resulting from the breach of fiduciary duty" by Defendants, up to and including, the "amount of compensation or payments received from" the Funds.

COUNT III
ICA § 36(b)
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
(Excessive Rule 12b-1 Distribution fees and Extraction of
Additional Compensation for Advisory Services)

69. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

70. The distribution fees charged and received by Defendants were designed to, and did, extract additional compensation for Defendants' advisory services in violation of Defendants' fiduciary duty under § 36(b). Although the distribution fees may have contributed to the growth in assets of the Funds, the resulting economies of scale benefited only Defendants, and not Plaintiffs or the Funds.

71. In failing to pass along economies-of-scale benefits from the distribution fees, and in continuing to assess distribution fees pursuant to plans of distribution despite the fact that no benefits inured to Plaintiffs, Defendants have violated, and continue to violate, the ICA and have breached and continue to breach their statutory fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs in violation of ICA § 36(b).

72. Plaintiffs seek, pursuant to § 36(b)(3) of the ICA, the "actual damages resulting from the breach of fiduciary duty" by Defendants, up to and including, the "amount of compensation or payments received from" the Funds.

COUNT IV
ICA § 12(b)
(Unlawful Distribution Plans)

73. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

74. Plaintiffs and the other shareholders in the Funds each paid service or distribution fees to Defendants.

75. When Defendants first initiated the Distribution Plans, they represented that the distribution fees were being collected in order to, at least in part, grow the assets of the Funds in order to reduce the cost to Plaintiffs of providing advisory services. Only one of the following alternatives could possibly have occurred:

- a. The Funds grew as a result of the payment of distribution fees and market forces, in which case economies of scale were generated but not passed on to Plaintiffs or the Funds; or
- b. The distribution fees did not contribute to economies of scale, produced no other material benefits for Plaintiffs and the other shareholders of the Funds, and should not have been approved or continued.

76. Either way, Defendants have violated § 12(b) of the ICA and Rule 12b-1, 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1, by accepting excessive or inappropriate compensation in violation of the fiduciary duty owed by them to the Funds. Defendants violation of § 12(b) and Rule 12b-1 is continuing in nature.


77. Plaintiffs seek damages resulting from the adoption and continuation of these unlawful Distribution Plans.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment as follows:

- a. An order declaring that Defendants have violated and continue to violate § 12, § 36(b), and Rule 12b-1 of the ICA and that any advisory or distribution agreements entered into are void ab initio;
- b. An order preliminarily and permanently enjoining Defendants from further violations of the ICA;
- c. An order awarding damages against Defendants including all fees paid to them by Plaintiffs and the Funds for all periods not precluded by any

applicable statutes of limitation through the trial of this case, together with interest, costs, disbursements, attorneys' fees, and such other items as may be allowed to the maximum extent permitted by law; and

d. Such other and further relief as may be proper and just.

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